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THE SCRAMBLE TO PROMOTE EGG DONATION THROUGH A 
MORE PROTECTIVE REGULATORY REGIME 
JACOB RADECKI*
INTRODUCTION
Can we put a price on the human body? This is the uncomfortable and 
difficult question that the process of human oocyte (egg) donation presents 
to both the legislator and the cash-strapped college student sitting in her 
dorm room. It is important at the outset to recognize egg donation for what 
it often is: egg sales. Young women are solicited from college campuses to 
“donate” their eggs for dollar amounts that can reach the tens of thou-
sands.1 This is a burgeoning business; it is estimated that over 100,000 
women have sold or donated eggs to clinics around the country.2 Opposi-
tion to this process abounds. A range of scholarship argues that egg sales 
contribute to the greater commodification of women’s bodies and exploit 
the poor.3 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine, which prom-
ulgates compensation guidelines for egg donations, notes that a significant 
critique of market-based compensation is that such compensation turns the 
building blocks of human life into mere products.4
In addition to the ethical controversy over whether to allow egg sales 
due to the special nature of reproductive tissue in creating human life, there 
are significant risks to the women who sell their eggs. Egg extraction pre-
sents numerous serious health risks to those undergoing the process.5 More 
than one egg needs to be harvested, as in-vitro fertilization (IVF) is an im-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author thanks Professor Lori Andrews 
and the staff of the Chicago-Kent Law Review for their assistance in developing this Note. The author 
also thanks his friends and family for their constant love and support; without them, this Note would not 
have been possible. 
 1.  Kari L. Karsjens, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and Patriarchy, 5
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 58 (2002). 
 2.  W. Kramer et al., US Oocyte Donors: A Retrospective Study of Medical and Psychosocial 
Issues, 24 HUM. REPROD. 3144 (2009). 
 3.  See Karsjens, supra note 1.
 4.  Ethics Comm. of the Amer. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte 
Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 306 (2007), available at
http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/ 
News_and_Publications/Ethics_Committee_Reports_and_Statements/financial_incentives.pdf. 
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perfect process that requires more than one attempt in most cases. To ac-
complish this, doctors administer drugs to stimulate the ovaries. This pro-
cess sometimes results in a condition called Ovarian Hyper-stimulation 
Syndrome (OHSS).6 Serious cases result in the enlargement of the ovaries7
and massive fluid build-up in the body, requiring intensive medical care.8
The rate of OHSS for those undergoing gonadotropin regimens, one of the 
most common methods of inducing stimulation, is around 0.3 to 5 percent, 
though due to the lack of available data and consistent definitions, that rate 
might be higher or lower.9 Anecdotal evidence has also shown that some 
frequent egg donors have contracted colon and other cancers thought to be 
a result of the process, though there is a dearth of statistical information 
precisely because of the lax regulatory environment.10
Critically, these potential harms are not addressed by any coherent, 
uniform system of regulation. There are presently no federal regulations on 
what risks clinics have to disclose to women.11 Certain states, though few, 
have their own regulations. Louisiana explicitly prohibits the sale of eggs,12
while Arizona, for example, permits egg donation but codified mandatory 
informed consent standards.13 While this Note argues that the compensation 
of egg donors should not be regulated, every state should adopt both adver-
tising and informed consent requirements. Advertising requirements detail-
ing the existence of potential harms may dissuade donors who are not well 
aware of the risk of injury from egg extraction. Additionally, informed 
consent requirements enable women to make the best choices for their own 
health and welfare while allowing them to retain their individual autonomy. 
Additionally, no state requires that clinics pay the significant medical 
costs associated with serious conditions such as OHSS that can result from 
 6.  See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145–46. 
 7.  Andrew Zacher, Oocyte Donor Compensation for Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Analy-
sis of New York’s “Payment for Eggs Program”, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 323, 335 (2011). 
 8.  Justine Durrell, Women’s Eggs: Exceptional Endings, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 195 
(2011). 
 9.  See id. at 195 n.57. Note that other studies have found a much higher rate of OHSS; the 
Kramer study referenced previously found that 30.3 percent of women experienced some degree of 
OHSS, while 11.6 percent experienced a severe enough case that required hospitalization. Kramer et al., 
supra note 2, at 3146. 
 10.  See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145 (noting that most IVF clinics do not keep in contact 
with former donors); see also Jennifer Schneider, Case Report: Fatal Colon Cancer in a Young Egg 
Donor, FERTILITY AND STERILITY 1.e1 (2008). 
 11.  The FDA does register clinics that perform egg extractions and mandates testing for donors. 
What You Should Know—Reproductive Tissue Donation, FDA.GOV (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.fda 
.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm232876.htm. 
 12.  See infra note 88. 
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the egg extraction process.14 This Note argues that clinics should provide 
insurance for women undergoing egg extraction or otherwise bear the cost 
of potential injuries. Requiring clinics to provide insurance for women who 
undergo these procedures places the financial burden on the shoulders of 
those who profit most from egg donation: the reproductive services indus-
try. Further, placing the burden on the clinics reduces the potential that 
women who donate their eggs might be financially burdened by medical 
costs.
Presently, there is no registry recording the rates of harm occurring to 
the donors.15 In 1992, Congress passed an existing reporting requirement 
relating only to pregnancy success rates by individual ART programs and 
the names of the laboratories used.16 This statute required such reports to 
flow through the Centers for Disease Control.17 While not a perfectly anal-
ogous situation, such a reporting requirement serves as a model for a re-
porting requirement to evaluate the long-term effects of egg extraction on 
egg donors.18 This Note argues that, due to the yet unevaluated potential 
long-term risks of OHSS, such as cancer, Congress should create a similar 
reporting requirement for long-term side effects. Such a requirement can 
increase the ability of regulators to respond to the risks of egg donation as 
they become clearer. 
Given the increasing demand for egg sales, the practice is likely to 
continue. Opponents of the for-profit reproductive industry regard the high 
compensation rates as commodification of the human body.19 Other argu-
ments suggest that the process of recruiting financially vulnerable young 
women is a new form of exploitation.20 Concededly, there may be elements 
of commodification and exploitation in the process. However, these con-
cerns cannot override the important interest an individual has in choosing 
what is best for her, including what to do with her own body. This Note 
concludes that, given the prevalence of reproductive tissue sales in society 
and the likelihood that the demand for eggs will increase, a comprehensive 
regulatory regime would account for the problems inherent in the sale of 
reproductive tissue while preserving an individual’s autonomy and com-
plete right to her own body. 
 14.  See infra notes 88–98.
 15.  What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CDC.GOV (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/.
 16.  42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (2013). 
 17.  Id.
 18.  See id.
 19.  See Karsjens, supra note 1. 
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This Note is comprised of four parts. Part I outlines the present prac-
tice of egg harvesting and sale in the United States. Part II analyzes criti-
cisms of the practice of reproductive tissue sales through the lens of both 
public policy and theory. Part III evaluates areas of risk and concern, exam-
ining the present regulatory regime surrounding egg donation, and finds 
this regime insufficient. Part IV provides several arguments. It argues that 
state regulations should mandate informed consent of risks before dona-
tions occur. Additionally, clinics that solicit women and extract their eggs 
should provide mandatory coverage for medical care in the event that a 
serious medical complication such as OHSS arises. Finally, a federal regis-
try should be created to collect information about the long-term health ef-
fects of OHSS and other negative externalities.21
I. THE PROCESS
Typically, the process begins with the solicitation of eggs from a 
woman with desirable characteristics.22 These can include the ability to 
play a musical instrument; athletic achievement; superior academic per-
formance, including high test scores on tests such as the SAT,23 LSAT, or 
GMAT; college degrees; graduate school attendance; or professional de-
grees such as law degrees or degrees in medicine.24 Given the significant 
debt incurred by attendees in those programs, it seems that the solicitations 
are specifically targeted toward the more educated or accomplished classes 
of women.25 However, solicitations do not limit requirements to objective 
criteria such as scores or school attendance.26 Some include ethnicity re-
quirements and appearance requirements.27
Advertisements commonly appear in student newspapers, targeting 
women who are most likely to fit the aforementioned criteria. A 2010 study 
 21.  All of the above proposals should pertain as well to self-extraction and extraction without 
compensation (i.e., between friends or family members). In fact, disclosure and reporting requirements 
are arguably more pertinent since the altruistic may be less likely to engage in risk-reward balancing 
and an evaluation of potential harms. 
 22. Steven R. Lindheim et al., Recruitment and Screening Policies and Procedures Used to Estab-
lish a Paid Donor Oocyte Registry, 13 HUM. REPROD. 2020, 2021–22 (1998). 
 23.  Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the Medical 
Market in Genetic Material, 72 AMER. SOC. REV. 319, 326–29 (2007); see also Genius Egg Donor 
Wanted, STANFORD DAILY, May 18, 2012, at 7, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/94009954/DAILY-05-18-12. 
 24.  See, e.g., For Donors, APERFECTMATCH.COM,
http://www.aperfectmatch.com/fordonors.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 25.  See Kramer et al., supra note 2 (stating that in 2004, around 1 percent of all U.S. infants born 
were conceived through IVF). 
 26.  See Almeling, supra note 23, at 327. 
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by The Hastings Center for Bioethics and Public Policy sampled 105 such 
advertisements.28 The study found that the majority of those advertisements 
were from agencies soliciting donations, and that most of the solicitations 
promised compensation between four and five thousand dollars.29 The av-
erage compensation offered was $9,190 dollars.30 However, fifteen solicita-
tions promised compensation between nineteen and twenty thousand 
dollars, and five offered thirty to forty thousand dollars.31
The entire process, from stimulation to harvesting, involves substan-
tial burdens on the donor. When a woman agrees to have eggs harvested, 
she typically signs a contract including surrendering her parental rights to 
any offspring from her eggs.32 Contracting happens privately between an 
agency and the donor, establishing, among other things, payment terms and 
obligations of both parties.33 However, given that there is little state regula-
tion, there is generally no requirement that the donor obtains legal coun-
sel.34 For that reason, it is unclear whether the donor truly understands the 
legal and physical implications of permitting her eggs to be harvested for 
cash. 
Even if she fits the requisite qualifications, however, the donor must 
submit to a series of genetic and blood tests to evaluate her suitability.35
Frequently, the donor must meet with a mental health counselor as well.36
Disqualifying characteristics can include a family history of mental disabil-
ity or serious illness such as cancer.37 The requirements are quite stringent; 
often, agencies request family information with great specificity, including 
a family medical history for at least two generations.38
After a woman is recruited, medically tested, and approved, the pro-
cess involved is both arduous and invasive, taking around six weeks.39 The 
process involves three stages. First, the donor will be injected with hor-
 28.  Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte 
Donors, 40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 29 (2010). 
 29.  Id.
 30.  Id. at 28. 
 31.  Id. at 29.
 32.  See AMER. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD-PARTY REPRODUCTION: A GUIDE FOR 
PATIENTS 15–16 (2012). 
 33.  Id. (noting that “many states allow for a declaration of parentage prior to the child’s birth”). 
 34.  See, e.g., infra notes 88–98.
 35.  See AMER. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 32, at 5–6. 
 36.  Id. (Noting that the ASRM supports this particular requirement). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 10. 
 39.  See Lynn M. Squillace, Too Much of a Good Thing: Toward a Regulated Market in Human 
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mones that suppress ovulation in preparation for stimulation.40 Lupron, one 
drug commonly used for that purpose, has side effects such as hot flashes, 
rashes, memory loss, chest pain, migraines, and dizziness, among 
ers.41 Second, after hormone levels are suppressed, daily injections of either 
follicle stimulating hormone or human menopausal gonadotropin are ad-
ministered. This stage encourages multiple follicles to develop so several 
mature eggs will simultaneously mature42 Finally, once the eggs are ma-
ture, an injection of human chorionic gonadotropin triggers ovulation.43
The eggs are typically retrieved about 36 hours after injection.44
Numerous complications can arise from this process. Risks from the 
retrieval process include structural damage to organs close to the ovaries. 
Severe injury to the bladder, uterus, bowel, or other pelvic structures is 
possible.45 Other risks include lacerations, infection, and hemorrhage.46 As 
with any surgery, there are risks inherent in using an anesthetic.47 However, 
OHSS is the most significant concern.48 While the cause of OHSS is not 
fully understood, it is likely caused by ovarian blood vessels reacting ab-
normally to high level of human chorionic gonadotropin in the donor’s 
body.49 These blood vessels leak fluid.50 Serious cases of OHSS involve 
blood clots, kidney failure, enlargement of the ovaries, and massive fluid 
build-up in the body, requiring intensive care treatment.51 The prevalence 
of OHSS in studies has ranged from 3 to 6 percent for moderate cases, 
while more severe cases occur in 0.3 to 5 percent of those undergoing the 
process, with the notable caveat that definitions of OHSS differ and that 
consistent data is hard to find.52 However, because of the lack of any re-
porting requirement and the relative novelty of the process in general, other 
 40.  See Durrell, supra note 8 at 194. See also Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Com-
modification in Assisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in 
Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE ON NONBIOLOGICAL PARENTING) 257, 
264 (2002). 
 41.  Shanley, supra note 40, at 264.  
 42.  Id.
 43.  Durell, supra note 8, at 194. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 194–95. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Pratap Kumar et al., Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, 4 J. HUM. REPROD. SCI. 70 (2011).  
 49.  See id.
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See Durrell, supra note 8, as well as the note’s discussion in its entirety. See also Kumar et 
al., supra note 48, where Kumar states that the rate of OHSS is between 0.1 percent and 3 percent. If 
anything, the variance between the statistics highlighted in these studies illustrates the need for further 
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problems may exist that have gone undiscovered. Further, anecdotal evi-
dence exists that the long-term effects of egg extraction might not be so 
limited.53 Several women have reported cancer diagnoses years later, which 
are thought to be a result of egg donation.54
II. THE EXPLOITATION EXPECTATION
If there are significant health risks from egg donation, is the process 
too exploitative to continue? Much of the critical scholarship regarding egg 
donation states that, because the process is physically and financially ex-
ploitative, compensation should be severely limited.55 Further, some argu-
ments regard the risk of a potential “eugenic effect” as determinative. This 
reasoning suggests that the ability to select the most “preferable” types of 
genetic material might lead to a situation in which the rich and poor will 
literally have different appearances. However, the most significant concern 
raised is that of long-term physical harm and exploitation. Given the signif-
icant liberty interest at stake and the likelihood that the practice will con-
tinue in some form in the face of significant price regulations, what should 
be addressed is not the monetary price of the eggs, but rather the potential 
physical price that women might pay as a result. 
A. Is Egg Donation Physically Exploitative? Examining the Organ    
Analogy 
One critique of the egg extraction process likens the sale of human 
eggs to that of human organs. Looking at that example, however, the anal-
ogy does not fit for several reasons. 
The United States bans the sale of organs and non-regenerative human 
tissue other than eggs.56 The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 
forbids the purchase and sale of human organs.57 The logic is partly based 
on the premise that permitting the sale of organs such as kidneys is inher-
ently damaging to the donor’s health. Kidneys and other organs do not 
regenerate, and permitting the sale of these tissues could result in greater 
risk of disease or other health externalities in the future than would other-
wise exist. Therefore, banning the sale of non-regenerative organs has 
some merits. While this Note does not purport to discuss the organ trade at 
 53.  See, e.g., Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145. 
 54.  Id.
 55.  See Karsjens, supra note 1. 
 56.  42 U.S.C. § 274e (2013).
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length, it is notable that this ban on organ sales creates a lack of available 
organs. As of this writing, the Department of Health & Human Services 
website, organdonor.gov, states that 123,655 people are waiting for an or-
gan and that 18 people will die each day waiting for one.58
The other part of the argument relates to exploitation. The assumption 
is that commodification of the human body disproportionately affects poor 
and underprivileged people and is generally deleterious to the fabric of 
society, emphasizing the binary between rich and poor. However, does the 
logic behind banning organ sales apply to egg sales? On the one hand, as 
reproductive tissue goes, egg and sperm sales cannot be equated. Women 
have a finite amount of eggs. Eggs are clearly not regenerative tissue in the 
same sense as sperm. The risks surrounding egg donation are also much 
greater than sperm donation, and the process inherent in harvesting them 
more arduous. 
Yet neither can eggs be equated with organs. Eggs are plainly not es-
sential to a woman’s bodily integrity in the sense of a kidney or other major 
organ. A woman might choose to sell her eggs with absolutely no desire to 
later have children. In that case, eggs have zero future value, and a woman 
should be able to exploit that resource for whatever gain she can. Further-
more, should a woman desire to have children later in life, egg donation 
does not necessarily preclude that possibility, though it might affect the 
likelihood in some way.59 Yet the United States does not, and should not, 
prevent women from having children later in life because of career or edu-
cational ambitions, mere circumstance, or simple desire. Neither does Con-
gress ban women from having children after a certain age, despite 
considerably greater risks of birth defects.60 Any paternalistic rationale for 
banning the sale of eggs should therefore be rejected. 
Certainly there is a justifiable concern with the risks outlined above. 
The retrieval process is an inherently dangerous and invasive medical pro-
cedure. Further, the risk of OHSS includes the potential for immediate 
health effects such as stroke or future risk of cancer or infertility. These 
legitimate concerns support the need for health risk disclosure and other 
similar regulation. However, health risks are implicated in many elective 
medical procedures, such as plastic surgery. No other procedure also ena-
bles a woman to give a life to a childless couple or benefit in a financially 
 58.  ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). The 
number cited is current as of the access date. 
 59.  See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145. 
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significant way from the procedure. Rather than preventing a woman from 
profiting from this process, regulations should facilitate a safer environ-
ment for donors, one in which willing women are made to fully understand 
the risks before they donate, if they choose to do so. 
B. Should Concerns about a Potential “Eugenic Effect” Preclude 
Compensation for Egg Donors? 
The eugenic effect argument is a fear of something out of science fic-
tion. In the movie Gattaca, the sale of designer reproductive tissue has 
proliferated to the extent that the few remaining “normal” people are pre-
cluded from life advancement.61 In Star Trek: The Wrath of Khan, the su-
per-rich designed hyper-intelligent, human ubermenschen who wrought 
havoc on the rest of humanity.62 Luckily for critics of the process, the mod-
ern world has little to fear from the eugenic effect of egg donation. 
First, as a practical matter, the science of intelligence and trait herita-
bility likely precludes a significant eugenic effect. Recent studies have 
suggested that half of intelligence is heritable, while the remainder is envi-
ronmental.63 The very fact that humankind has yet to discern how intelli-
gence is constituted in the human brain suggests that the supposed eugenic 
effect is overblown. Even if these somewhat reductive beliefs about the 
heritability of intelligence exist as motivating factors for the trade in eggs, 
any rationale for regulating genetic choice should not rest on concerns 
about what might happen based on private activities such as egg donation. 
Second, a more pressing concern is the subtle issue of stigmatization 
and societal pressure to conform to aesthetic standards. If the process of 
egg extraction and donation proliferated, widespread implementation could 
theoretically result in a bifurcated society. Those with wealth and means 
would be able to select the most socially preferable genetic traits, such as 
skin or eye color, creating “designer babies.” However, given that the gov-
ernment does not intervene in people’s individual choice of mates, neither 
should the government regulate the decisions of individuals who wish for 
their children to have certain traits. Notably, given the varying likelihood of 
heritability for traits, there is no guarantee that the more “favored” traits 
will actually materialize. There are too many variables with respect to ge-
netics for the offering of “preferable” eggs to dramatically affect societal 
 61.  GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997). 
 62.  STAR TREK II: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982). 
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perceptions in ways more influential than present society has dreamed up 
on its own. 
Additionally, the stigmatization rationale should only apply to restrict 
egg donations if it similarly applies to sperm donations. Sperm donors fre-
quently are subjected to the same rigorous academic, physical, and fre-
quently aesthetic requirements.64 These aesthetic desires are holdovers 
from older societal perceptions of what kind of appearance is preferable. 
Thus the question becomes whether this kind of selectivity in traits is a 
symptom or a driver of the disease; it is far more likely, given the social-
ized nature of “attractiveness” and desirability, that such preferences fall 
into the former category. As previously mentioned, even if reproductive 
tissue donation eventually became more akin to a driver of such prefer-
ences, there is no reason that on its own, it would be more pervasive than 
the influences of myriad beauty products and commercial media existing 
presently. 
Third, as a pragmatic issue closely related to that in the second point, 
genetic selection happens during mating on a large scale generally. The 
United States does not preclude couples from having children based on any 
trait except those in which the government has a significant interest, such 
as preventing inbreeding. Regulating mating choices smacks of government 
overreach and the very kind the Supreme Court rejected in Loving v. Vir-
ginia.65 In overturning miscegenation laws, the Supreme Court in Loving
stated that marriage was a fundamental right.66 So too is the right to procre-
ate. The opposite proposition permits a government to select with whom an 
individual can reproduce, and fundamentally violates the principle of indi-
vidual liberty and autonomy at issue in Loving.
In addition, it is evident that individuals in the United States tend to 
self-select based on a variety of factors; most marriages are between mem-
bers of the same race and educational background.67 While much is made 
of the possible preference for blonde-haired, blue-eyed egg donors, a so-
cially constructed preference should not impact the legality of a practice. 
Notably, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), which 
promulgates guidelines related to egg donation, prohibits member clinics 
 64.  Almeling, supra note 23, at 325–27. 
 65.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  See Wendy Wang, The Rise of Intermarriage, PEW SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1, 48 (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/SDT-Intermarriage-II.pdf. While the study’s 
summary appropriately lauds the recent increase in interracial marriage and acceptance thereof, it is 
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from advertising based on particular aesthetic traits.68 However, clearly 
some people refuse to reproduce with individuals who are not of a particu-
lar category, including on the basis of physical traits or standards like edu-
cational background. Pursuant to the liberty interest noted above, the 
government would not attempt to impose mating selection on individuals as 
a general matter; so too should the government refuse to do so in the case 
of egg donation. Permitting compensation for egg donation actually con-
forms to this liberty interest in allowing individuals to choose the kind of 
genetic material that will constitute their future children. 
C. Is Egg Donation Financially Exploitative? 
A more significant argument against the sale of eggs is one of finan-
cial exploitation. It is true that those willing to subject themselves to the 
process of egg extraction are likely those in a difficult financial situation. 
However, it is not as if an egg from one woman is considered as valuable 
as an egg from another, unlike in the case of kidney sales. The women of-
fered thousands of dollars for their eggs are college attendees or graduates, 
sometimes with (or in pursuit of) graduate degrees.69 In other words, these 
women have the intellectual capacity to understand the risks and rewards. 
Certainly there is a risk that these young women will not have the 
foresight to consider the risks to their future fertility or whether they will 
suffer emotionally from not knowing whether they have biological proge-
ny. However, situations abound in which young women, above the age of 
eighteen, are considered responsible enough to make decisions that might 
affect their future health. Both men and women work in high-risk profes-
sions because they are accorded a significant liberty interest and right to 
contract. Take pornography as an example. This is a profession which 
many people consider exploitative to at least some degree. Yet society 
permits the profession to exist precisely because it implicates this liberty 
interest and right to contract. Rather than driving the practice underground, 
where exploitation will certainly occur, it is preferable to craft reasonable 
regulations to protect participants. 
Further, as a basic matter, women should be given the full ability to 
deal with their bodies as they see fit. Restricting a woman’s ability to sell 
her eggs harkens back to historical prohibitions against contraception and, 
ironically, norms of a woman’s body as property (albeit in that case, her 
father’s or husband’s). An element of protectionism undeniably persists in 
 68.  Ethics Committee of the Amer. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 4 at 307–08. 
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society with respect to women’s bodies. Denying women the agency to 
contract and presuming their inability to weigh the issue is further paternal-
ism that serves a well-meaning, if ill-aimed, purpose. This historical trend 
has been tough to reverse, and it is certainly possible that a large part of the 
uncomfortableness with which people approach questions of reproductive 
rights stems precisely from this paternalistic background. 
Yet it is true that there would be more cause for concern if those being 
targeted by advertisements were poor women, and they were targeted due 
to some drastic increase in the infertility of women generally. This is pre-
cisely the situation implicated in the now-illegal trade in organs. Still, as 
noted above, eggs are not analogous to organs. Though eggs are finite, they 
are not essential to a woman’s life in the sense of a kidney, for example, 
which is required to filter waste. There are also obviously more eggs than 
organs, and the demand is different, given that not every couple wishes to 
have children, and most that do are capable of making use of their own 
reproductive material. However, even if poor women were being targeted 
by advertisements soliciting egg donations, that would still be insufficient 
justification to ban compensation. Rather, such an occurrence would actual-
ly support the need for regulations that increase disclosure of potential 
health risks, and protect the health of those who undergo these procedures. 
That type of regulatory regime does not exist now. This should be rectified 
going forward. 
III. EXAMINING THE EXISTING REGULATORY REGIME
Given that there are significant health risks inherent in the egg dona-
tion process, strong regulatory mechanisms should exist to ensure that 
those women who choose to become donors have all the information avail-
able to them. Further, these regulations should prevent the financial exploi-
tation that can occur as a result of potential medical issues. Finally, 
regulations should exist to facilitate the continued study of potential long-
term harms such as cancer. This section evaluates existing guidelines and 
potential regulatory options. Unfortunately, the existing guidelines are fre-
quently voluntary, and where states have created statutory regimes, they are 
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A. While Private Organizations Like the ASRM Promulgate          
Regulations, the Lack of a Statutory Regime Precludes Meaningful       
Enforcement 
While there are few government regulations controlling the use of this 
technology, the ASRM has issued guidelines in concert with the Society for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART).70 ASRM and SART are pro-
fessional organizations that set standards for member-clinics to follow in 
the advertisement, compensation, and performance of egg donation. The 
ASRM ethics committee recommends limiting compensation for egg dona-
tion, stating sums of “$5,000 or more require justification and sums above 
$10,000 are not appropriate.”71 These guidelines attempt to restrain the 
potential for unbridled capitalism in the egg donation industry.72 And yet 
these guidelines are frequently, if not routinely, flouted. As noted above, 
the Hastings Center study indicated that over a quarter of solicitations ex-
ceeded the ASRM guidelines.73 There is obviously no enforcement mecha-
nism for these guidelines outside of the independent regulations adopted by 
the states.74
SART offers advertising guidelines, but these mainly pertain to poten-
tial exploitation of recipients.75 For example, SART’s advertising guide-
lines require that the advertisements comply with Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) guidelines, the advertisements’ claims are supported by 
verifiable data, and the advertisements do not compare clinic-specific data 
such as success rates.76 According to the guidelines, “live births must be 
reported if within the time frame” of the report in question, and all cycles 
within the period have to be reported.77 While the SART advertising guide-
lines present a framework for potential future regulations, they do not di-
rectly address the issues in question here.78
The ASRM also offers informed consent guidelines, requiring that 
clinics provide “all relevant information necessary to make an informed 
 70.  Ethics Committee of the Amer. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 4. 
 71.  Id. at 305. 
 72.  See id.
 73.  Levine, supra note 28, at 26–27. 
 74.  This Note does not argue that ASRM’s financial guidelines, or any financial limitations, 
should be placed on clinics or interested parties.  
 75.  See SART Newsletter, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. 1, 3 (Fall 2011), available at
http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/Affiliates/SART/SART_Links/SART%20Newsletter%20Summer-
Fall%202011.pdf.
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id.
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decision,” and that potential donors have the ability to ask questions in 
furtherance of their understanding.79 Accordingly, all donors should be 
provided with comprehensive information concerning the benefits and 
risks.80 These guidelines extend also to the recipient, who should be in-
formed that there are alternative methods of rectifying infertility problems, 
including adoption.81 All of these communications should be recorded in 
medical records and written informed consent should be secured.82 Clinics 
should provide counseling prior to donations so donors understand the po-
tential negative psychological effects,83 such as that future desires to con-
nect with their offspring might not be accommodated. 
ASRM’s informed consent guidelines offer a model for states to fol-
low in implementing mandatory informed consent. Independently, ASRM 
guidelines do not have any teeth; violations offer no detriment to the viola-
tor except potential expulsion from the ASRM. Thus, there is frequently 
little to no incentive for compliance. However, if these types of guidelines 
were backed by significant civil or even criminal penalties for violations, 
clinics and service providers would take notice and have greater incentive 
to comply. 
B. Federal Regulations are Non-Existent, and the State Statutory    
Regimes are Piecemeal and Oftentimes Ineffective 
There are no federal regulations regarding egg sales. This makes the 
United States somewhat exceptional among industrialized nations.84 The 
result of this laissez-faire atmosphere is that the market tends to determine 
the price of eggs. As noted previously, though some donations are within 
the cautionary margin of above $5,000 dollars and below $10,000, a full 
quarter of the donations in one study did not adhere to the regulations.85
Further, there are no specific regulations regarding the informed consent of 
egg donors. Nor are there any reporting requirements for negative health 
effects on donors, while there are for success rates of IVF.86
 79.  ARSM PRACTICE COMMITTEE, Revised Minimum Standards for Practices Offering Assisted 




 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 167.
 84.  See, e.g., infra notes 101–105. 
 85.  Levine, supra note 28, at 26–27.
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Additionally, the majority of states do not have any regulations on egg 
sales.87 Louisiana prohibits compensation of egg donors for any reason.88
Arizona,89 California,90 Connecticut,91 Maryland,92 and Massachusetts93
prohibit compensating egg donors for research purposes,94 but do not pro-
hibit the same for IVF. Arizona does have an informed consent statute, 
requiring doctors to describe the hormone regimen, for example, and possi-
ble physical effects.95 Indiana permits compensation for egg harvesting for 
IVF purposes, limiting the amount to $4,000 as compensation and expenses 
for earnings lost, travel, hospital and medical expenses.96 New York allows 
compensation and expenses for both IVF and research.97
In some cases, what little state regulation exists is almost completely 
toothless. California recently passed a law requiring health risk warnings 
for egg donations.98 However, this law only requires including health warn-
ings with those advertisements that do not fall within the ASRM’s guide-
lines.99 This seems counterintuitive given that the health risks inherent in 
the egg extraction process do not subside simply because compensation 
falls within the ASRM guidelines. Recently, California’s Governor Jerry 
Brown also vetoed a bill that would have permitted compensation for egg 
donations for research as well.100 Given this survey of state prohibitions 
and limitations, there remains a distinct lack of regulation with respect to 
the three issues of informed consent, healthcare costs, and evaluating long-
term health effects. 
 87.  See infra notes 88–98. 
 88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2008) (stating that “[t]he sale of a human ovum, fertilized 
human ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited.”). 
 89.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1703 (West 2014). 
 90.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125350 (West 2012). 
 91.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-32d(c)(3) (West 2013) (stating in pertinent part, “[a] person who 
elects to donate for stem cell research purposes any human embryos or embryonic stem cells . . . shall 
not receive direct or indirect payment”). 
 92.  MD. CODE ANN. ECON. DEV. § 10-439 (2008). 
 93.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111L, § 8 (West 2003) (stating “[n]o person shall knowingly and 
for valuable consideration purchase, sell, transfer, or otherwise obtain human embryos . . . for research 
purposes.”).
 94.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1703; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325; CONN. GEN.
STAT § 19a-32d(c)(3); MD. CODE ANN. ECON. DEV. § 10-439; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111L, § 8. 
 95.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1702. 
 96.  IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-3 (West 2012).
 97.  N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 265-a (West 2012). 
 98.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325. 
 99.  Id. 
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C. International Programs Might Provide a Model, but They         
Frequently Proscribe Compensation 
Conversely, many other countries do not permit egg sales for any 
price. Great Britain, for example, follows the Human Fertilization and Em-
bryology Act of 1990.101 The English regulatory agency, the Human Ferti-
lization and Embryology Authority (HFEA), discourages clinics from using 
donors whom they suspect have been paid by the recipient.102 Under that 
law, egg donors can receive compensation for expenses up to 750 
pounds.103 Limited compensation for donors eliminates the financial incen-
tive for donors, leaving solely an altruistic one. Many countries, such as 
Israel and Denmark, restrict egg donation to egg-sharing as a solution to the 
compensation problem.104 Others, such as Germany, bar compensation 
outright.105
Under the health system in England, couples are also offered free IVF 
treatment through the National Health Service’s egg-sharing process.106
During the egg donation process, there are frequently leftover eggs, which 
can be distributed to or “shared” with other interested parties.107 This limits 
the risk of harm to fewer women, and further rejects the idea that egg dona-
tion should be targeted at those with the supposed ideal characteristics, 
which is the norm as exemplified by the solicitations described above. Ad-
ditionally, egg-sharing reduces the cost of the IVF process; “appropriate” 
donors who conform to the desires of the individual recipients cannot be 
found since the very premise of egg-sharing is that the donors are anony-
mous.108 In England, for example, recipients are not informed about the 
identities of their donors; however, individuals conceived after April 1, 
 101.  See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (U.K.). 
 102.  See Kamal K. Ahuja, et al., Egg Sharing and Egg Donation: Attitudes of British Egg Donors 
and Recipients, 12 HUM. REPROD. 2845, 2845 (1997). 
 103.  Egg Donation & Egg Sharing, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH.,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/ 
egg-donation-and-egg-sharing.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2014). 
104. K.K. Ahuja & E.G. Simons, Cancer of the Colon in an Egg Donor: Policy Repercussions for 
Donor Recruitment, 13 HUM. REPROD. 227, 229 (1998). 
 105.  See Bonnie Steinbock, Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy, 71 MOUNT SINAI J. OF 
MED. 255, 256 (2004). According to the article, compensation is illegal in Norway, Sweden, and Japan 
as well. Id.
106. See Can I get IVF treatment on the NHS?, NHS (May 8, 2013),
http://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg156/resources/guidance-fertility-pdf; see also NAT’L INST. FOR 
HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE, FERTILITY: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH FERTILITY 
PROBLEMS 42–43 (2013). 
 107.  Egg Share Programme, UNIV. HOSPS. COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE,
http://www.uhcw.nhs.uk/ivf/treatments/esp (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
 108.  See If You Were Conceived after 1 April 2005, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH.,
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2005, are able to inquire to the HFEA regarding identifying information 
about their biological parents.109
Egg-sharing provides a viable alternative for those couples who lack a 
specific genetic desire for their progeny or the funding to be more selective. 
However, egg-sharing does not eliminate the market for more selective 
alternatives. Additionally, egg-sharing is arguably more coercive in some 
ways. Egg-sharing regimes require couples to give up the ability to choose 
their offspring’s genetic origins. Significantly, this is the other end of the 
spectrum from the “eugenic effect” noted above that is feared by some. 
Couples should have some ability to choose the genetic origins of their 
children. Defaulting to a system in which egg-sharing is the only option 
implicates this significant liberty interest and might also drive more selec-
tive-minded couples to countries with a more permissive regulatory envi-
ronment. 
D. The FTC has Power to Penalize Those Who Issue False and        
Misleading Advertisements, but cannot Address the Significant Deficits in 
Information Given to Donors 
While there are no federal regulations directly relating to advertise-
ments soliciting egg donors, the FTC has brought suit against advertisers 
for false and misleading claims related to in-vitro fertilization success 
rates.110 For example, in 1995, the FTC reached a consent agreement with 
the Arizona Institute of Reproductive Medicine (AIRM) with respect to 
fabricated success rates.111 AIRM counted multiple births (e.g., twins or 
triplets) as multiple deliveries, raising their in-vitro success rates.112 In their 
advertisements, AIRM compared their success rates favorably to those 
collected and published by SART, which reports such multiple births as 
single deliveries.113 Finally, AIRM reported the national average incorrect-
ly; while SART reported the national average as around 17 percent, AIRM 
stated that it was 14 percent.114 In either case, had AIRM counted multiple 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FYI: FTC Gives Final Approval to Consent 
Agreement with Arizona Institute of Reproductive Medicine, Ltd. (Oct. 3, 1995), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1995/10/fyi-ftc-gives-final-approval-consent-agreement-
arizona-institute.
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
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births as single deliveries, AIRM’s numbers would have been lower than 
the national average.115
While the FTC retains the power to address false and misleading 
claims in solicitations for egg donors, the FTC does not monitor compli-
ance with advertising requirements, though it could if they were adopted, as 
proposed by this Note. Additionally, the FTC’s present powers enable the 
organization to assign relatively minor civil penalties for those false and 
misleading claims. As noted in the consent agreement with the AIRM de-
tailed above, a consent agreement “does not constitute admission of a law 
violation.”116 Subsequent violations of orders can result in civil penalties up 
to $10,000.117 Given the extent of the trade at issue, and the sizeable sums 
involved in the purchase and sale, these types of civil penalties are unlikely 
to have a significant deterrent effect. Stronger advertising requirements 
should be adopted, both by the FTC independently and with the assistance 
of Congress. 
E. While the FDA could Choose to Evaluate the Risks of Drugs Used 
in Egg Extraction, They have Failed to do so Thus Far 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has previously evalu-
ated Lupron, though not for its common use in the egg donation process.118
Off-label use of drugs like Lupron is not illegal, and is in fact quite com-
mon. Thus, while the FDA has noted potential risks for Lupron use in spe-
cific contexts, the FDA has yet to evaluate whether Lupron presents 
different risks when used for egg extraction. 
Lupron functions by shutting down testosterone production in men 
and estrogen production in women.119 Lupron was originally developed to 
treat hormone-responsive cancers such as prostate cancer.120 The drug is 
FDA-approved for that purpose, as well as more recently for endometriosis 
and fibroids.121 However, off-label uses are common; as noted above, Lu-
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See FDA Drug Safety Communication: Ongoing Safety Review of GnRH Agonists and Possi-




2.htm#table (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter FDA Drug Safety Communication].
 119.  Lupron Depot, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 5,  
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/020011s040lbl.pdf (last updated Jan. 2012). 
 120.  FDA Drug Safety Communication, supra note 118. 
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pron is one drug frequently used in the first stages of the stimulation pro-
cess necessary for multiple-egg extraction.122 The FDA has not evaluated 
the safety or effectiveness of Lupron when used in the context of the egg 
donation process.123
Significant risks exist even when Lupron is used in approved ways.124
According to the FDA, hyperglycemia, increased risk of diabetes, and in-
creased risk of heart attack and stroke have all been reported by men taking 
Lupron as treatment for prostate cancer.125 Lupron’s prescribing infor-
mation notes that women have reported hot flashes, headaches, mood 
swings, myalgia, and a decrease in bone density.126 As noted previously, 
the full effects of Lupron on women who undergo the egg donation process 
are not yet known due to this off-label usage.127
Since it is clear that the FDA has not evaluated the risks of Lupron in 
a way useful to consumers for the purposes of this article, the question then 
becomes whether FDA regulations of other risky drugs present a viable, 
existing alternative. For example, the sedative thalidomide is known to 
cause a high rate of severe birth defects when administered to pregnant 
women.128 The solid work of FDA physicians kept the drug from the Amer-
ican market in the mid-1960s, and the drug was only approved in 1998 for 
treatment of leprosy129 and in 2013 for multiple myeloma.130 When thalid-
omide was approved for leprosy, the FDA implemented a strict regulation 
system.131 Pharmacists must register with the manufacturing Celgene Cor-
poration, patients must fill out surveys regarding their use of the drug, and 
women using thalidomide must take two forms of birth control and undergo 
pregnancy tests.132 This program is called the “System for Thalidomide 
Education and Prescribing Safety,” or “S.T.E.P.S.”133
 122.  See, e.g., Cathy L. Brizek, et al., Increased Incidence of Aberrant Morphological Phenotypes 
in Human Embryogenesis, 12 J. OF ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 106, 107 (1995). 
 123.  FDA Drug Safety Communication, supra note 118. 
 124.  Id.
 125.  Id. 
126.  Lupron Depot, supra note 119, at 8. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Proposed Changes to Approved Thalidomid Package Insert, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 1 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2006/021430s000,020785s031lbl.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2015). 
 129.  Jerome B. Zeldis et al., S.T.E.P.S.: A Comprehensive Program for Controlling and Monitor-
ing Access to Thalidomide, 21 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 319, 320 (1999). 
 130.  Proposed Changes to Approved Thalidomid Package Insert, supra note 128, at 10. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 325–28. 
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Certainly such a program would address critics’ concerns that Lupron 
is not being monitored properly with respect to usage in the egg extraction 
process. But the first step, prior to any form of requirements, is to evaluate 
the safety of Lupron for egg extraction and the long-term effects of the 
process on women’s health. This requires the FDA to oversee the use of 
Lupron for such ends, which the FDA has thus far failed to do. While tha-
lidomide might provide an example of how Lupron can be monitored in the 
future, the problems with the egg extraction process are more multifaceted 
and the dangers less obvious due to the length of time at issue. The FDA 
should first evaluate the effects of Lupron on women who undergo the egg 
extraction process. Subsequent to a determination about the health effects, 
a policy determination can be made. However, the FDA requires assistance 
in determining the effects of egg extraction, given that the individuals who 
undergo the process are so geographically disparate and the process is pres-
ently unregulated in most states. This leads to the necessity of reporting 
requirements, which will be discussed further in this Note. 
IV. TOWARD A MORE PROTECTIVE REGULATORY REGIME
Due to the significant interests in protecting the health and safety of 
donors outlined above, it is clear that the United States requires a stronger 
regulatory regime. While the argument that compensation should be nomi-
nal should be rejected, due to the individual right to contract, the circum-
stances under which women enter into donation contracts can be regulated. 
There is a significant state interest in protecting the lives and livelihoods of 
donors. At present, regulations are insufficient to protect the women who 
undergo these procedures. Without such regulation, financial and physical 
exploitation is likely to continue. However, there are three areas in which 
substantial improvement and greater regulation can occur. 
First, with respect to informed consent, states should adopt require-
ments mandating that agencies describe the potential health risks of egg 
extraction in their solicitations. This requirement should also extend to the 
actual clinics that participate in the extraction process, along the lines of 
Arizona’s law mandating informed consent standards.134 Second, clinics 
should be obligated to pay health coverage for the negative health effects 
resulting from OHSS. Statutes could compel clinics to purchase short-term 
insurance policies covering these ill effects. Women suffering from serious 
medical problems as a result of OHSS should not be required to pay for 
procedures, which, in many occasions, exceed the dollar amount of their 
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compensation. Finally, a federal reporting requirement should exist to doc-
ument the long-term health effects of OHSS and egg extractions. As noted 
above, there is a significant lack of information about the prevalence of 
these conditions, particularly pertaining to the long-term health effects. 
While individuals obviously cannot be required to report their medical 
conditions, clinics performing these procedures can report the rates of 
OHSS and attempt to collect information on the long-term effects of this 
procedure through their access to former donors. 
A. States should Develop and Mandate Informed Consent                
Requirements for Egg Donations 
While many egg extraction clinics do provide information about po-
tential health risks and side effects,135 states should adopt statutes mandat-
ing that such information be provided. First, each advertisement, 
irrespective of whether it conforms to ASRM guidelines, should note the 
potential health effects. Second, all clinics should outline in detail each 
negative health ramification that could result, including rare but serious 
effects such as OHSS and possibly even cancer. 
However, regulations should not restrict advertising content, whether 
that relates to the type of individual solicited or the amount of money to be 
paid. For example, an advertisement that states that “[w]e are an Ivy 
League couple . . . seeking the help of a special woman who is a healthy, 
Caucasian, with highest percentile ACT/SAT scores . . . tall, slender, dark 
to light blonde hair, blue eyes, and under the age of 28” should not be al-
tered for that content, however questionable.136 However, each advertise-
ment should be required to divulge the most relevant potential health risks. 
For instance, the above advertisement should include reference to the po-
tential harms that arise from OHSS. They should note, at the least, that 
severe instances of disease occur in 0.3 to 5 percent of cases, and that the 
most severe cases result in sterility.137
At a bare minimum, states should adopt ASRM guidelines and require 
that clinics conform with respect to informed consent and disclosure. While 
clinics frequently disclose the extent of the risk to some degree, a more full 
 135.  See, e.g, Egg Donation Risks and Side Effects, TINY TREASURES L.L.C., 
http://www.tinytreasuresagency.com/donors/risks/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 136.  Melinda Henneberger, The Ultimate Easter Egg Hunt: ‘Ivy League Couple’ Seeks Donor with 
‘Highest Scores,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-
people/wp/2013/03/21/the-ultimate-easter-egg-hunt-ivy-league-couple-seeks-donor-with-highest-
percentile-scores/. 





      03/25/2015   13:32:44
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 203 Side B      03/25/2015   13:32:44
12P - RADECKI FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2015 3:17 PM 
750 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:2 
explanation, both of the potential long-term effects and the short-term con-
sequences, should be required. In particular, each individual should, in 
accordance with ASRM disclosure guidelines, undergo mandatory counsel-
ing prior to donation.138 This practice would minimize criticism that young 
women are less aware of the psychological effects of having offspring by 
ensuring that they are fully briefed on the consequences of egg extraction. 
Additionally, advertisements should at the very least note that the 
long-term effects of OHSS have not been fully explored. While anecdotal 
evidence indicates that some long-term risk of cancer exists, the evidence is 
yet equivocal.139 In a sense, this follows the regulation of any medication. 
Everyone is accustomed to hearing the list of side effects at the end of a 
commercial for one medication or another. Mandating that advertisements 
include reasonable warnings does not impose an inappropriate burden on 
agencies that seek out young women as donors. Rather, such warnings 
adequately address the significant concern that young women in need of 
money might be exploited by overly optimistic representations of the diffi-
cult process which they will face if they choose to become donors. 
Further, and perhaps more importantly, each clinic which performs the 
egg extraction procedure should be required to provide certain information 
relating to informed consent. New York, for example, requires that infor-
mation surrounding the risks of use of hormones be described to the do-
nor.140 A sample form states: 
The possible risks and complications from retrieval of eggs from my 
ovaries and the prolonged use of hormones has been explained to me and 
I understand these risks and complications. I understand my failure to 
comply with instructions given by, or to appear for appointments 
with, [name of laboratory or institution] may negatively impact my 
health. In addition, I understand that [I] shall be responsible for the cost 
of any medical treatment of complications arising from my donation.141
Similarly, Arizona has led the way in requiring that the adverse poten-
tial from egg donations be described to donors.142 In many ways, Arizona’s 
description could serve as a model for federal or further state regulation. 
The statute requires, in part: 
2. A description of all procedures to be performed on the egg donor, in-
cluding the purpose, duration and estimated recovery time for each pro-
cedure.
 138.  See ARSM PRACTICE COMMITTEE, supra note 79, at 165–68. 
 139.  See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145. 
 140.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 52-8.8 (2008). 
 141.  12A NEW YORK FORMS: LEGAL AND BUSINESS ch. 28B:26 (West, Westlaw updated through 
2014).





      03/25/2015   13:32:44
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 204 Side A      03/25/2015   13:32:44
12P - RADECKI FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2015 3:17 PM 
2015] REGULATING EGG DONATION 751 
3. Medically accurate disclosures concerning all potential risks of egg 
donation that a reasonable patient would consider material to the deci-
sion of whether to undergo the procedure, including the medical risks as-
sociated with the surgical procedure and the drugs, medications and 
hormones prescribed for ovarian stimulation during the process. 
4. A description of the effects that the surgical procedure and the drugs, 
medications and hormones may have on future attempts of the egg donor 
to become pregnant. 
5. Notice that the egg donor cannot be completely informed of all poten-
tial risks or effects because all potential risks or effects and the magni-
tude of those risks or effects may not be known.143
The benefit of presenting the risks to potential donors far outweighs 
the incidental cost of some women refusing to donate. In fact, mandating 
universal disclosure requirements would only enable women to better 
weigh costs and benefits of undergoing an egg extraction. At present, the 
majority of states lack any mandated requirement to inform women of the 
risks.144 Providing such information ensures that those going through the 
procedure understand the risks, and thus might be better for the industry in 
the long run, given the potential harm of lawsuits or reputational harm that 
a lack of information might promote. 
However, nothing in these requirements or disclosures should enable 
clinics to escape financial liability for resultant harms. Rather, by requiring 
that clinics affirmatively address these harms, states can ensure that women 
make the best possible decision for their physical, rather than financial,
health in choosing to undergo egg donation. Disclosure does not necessari-
ly impute comprehension; further, enabling clinics to escape liability simp-
ly by virtue of laying out potential harms defeats the purpose of shifting the 
burdens on the clinics. Therefore, disclosure should be conceptualized as 
relating to the risk of physical harm. Then, if physical harm occurs, clinics 
can still alleviate what would otherwise be a potentially crippling financial 
burden if laid on the women themselves. 
In sum, an informed consent requirement in both advertisements and 
prior to procedures would enable the industry to protect itself from liability 
while ensuring that women are cognizant of all the potential harms that 
might result. Equal information protects the liberty interest of women in 
availing themselves of egg donation, while simultaneously protecting those 
women, as members of the public, from physical exploitation. While some 
might argue that these regulations would reduce the availability of eggs, 
this is not a negative effect: women who would not donate if knowledgea-
 143. Id.
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ble of the risks should not be donating in any case. Providing information 
ensures that both parties are willing to incur the relative costs and benefits, 
and protects both parties from the former. 
B. Clinics should Bear the Financial Burden for Negative Health     
Effects on Donors 
As noted previously, OHSS can have severe health effects such as 
stroke or even infertility.145 Though the incidence of severe OHSS is rela-
tively rare, when it occurs, donors can be left with significant health care 
costs far exceeding their monetary compensation. Therefore, states should 
require clinics to pay the healthcare costs of women who undergo egg ex-
traction and suffer from health problems such as severe OHSS. Requiring 
that clinics purchase short-term health insurance for donors could suffice, 
assuming such insurance covered OHSS, While some might contend that 
this requirement will lower the compensation for egg donors, the benefit of 
protecting donors far outweighs the potential costs. 
Presently, most compensation for injuries suffered during medical 
procedures relies on malpractice claims. As a general matter, this obviously 
requires there to be some misdeed by the physician in the process of the 
procedure. Yet malpractice coverage is insufficient for the kind of harms at 
issue here. OHSS is not always a result of malpractice; the syndrome can 
occur in between 0.3 to 5 percent of cases where the drug regimen is ad-
ministered properly.146 Therefore, the issue is not one of malpractice, but of 
inherent risk. And the potential harm is great; the most severe cases of 
OHSS can result in life-threatening complications.147 Typical malpractice 
recovery would not account for such injuries. 
However, these medical costs also should not be placed on the solicit-
ing couples. Loss-spreading is best practiced when there is a wider base 
upon which the harm will lie. This soft-landing approach of requiring clin-
ics to pay medical costs also achieves the same goal that targeting couples 
would; those benefiting most from the egg extraction process are the ones 
who should compensate donors for their harms. It is the clinics, rather than 
the couples, who possess a primarily financial motive. Additionally, these 
clinics provide services to many individuals, and have the financial capaci-
ty to account for the harms inherent in their work. While this loss-spreading 
might lead to slightly higher costs to couples, or slightly lower compensa-
 145.  See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145. 
 146.  Durrell, supra note 9. See also the discussion at supra note 9. 





      03/25/2015   13:32:44
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 205 Side A      03/25/2015   13:32:44
12P - RADECKI FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2015 3:17 PM 
2015] REGULATING EGG DONATION 753 
tion for donors, it is better to share the effects of the harms up-front than 
cripple, financially and physically, donors who are relative neophytes to 
this specific market. 
Next, requiring couples to pay for the sometimes-staggering cost of 
medical care resulting from egg extraction could have a dissuasive effect. 
This dissuasive effect should not be favored as it implicates a risk alluded 
to at the outset of this Note; where couples are dissuaded from engaging in 
egg donation in a jurisdiction, they are likely to merely change forums. The 
regulatory regime with the greatest utility provides donors with information 
sufficient to reach a conclusion about the risk to their health and healthcare 
coverage to prevent financial harm while still providing a favorable envi-
ronment for soliciting couples who have an understandable desire to repro-
duce.
Given that one of the most salient concerns of the entire egg donation 
process is the exploitation of the women who donate, payment of medical 
expenses mitigates a significant potential harm. Requiring that clinics pay 
for short-term health insurance, or medical bills in the case of severe medi-
cal issues arising from the procedure, ensures that such exploitation will 
not occur. Certainly, agencies often target women who have significant 
amounts of student loans and other debt.148 Providing that these women do 
not have to pay for medical care resulting from severe OHSS and other 
illnesses would ensure that they are not making a choice that will further 
cripple them financially. It is obvious that potential physical harms cannot 
always be mitigated. Yet society must help balance the interest in protect-
ing these donors and facilitating their liberty interest. Mandating that clin-
ics provide health coverage for this condition provides an adequate balance 
between the interest of donors in their own health, and the interest of recip-
ients and clinics in finding such donors. 
C. Congress should Create a Reporting Requirement Regarding the 
Long-Term Effects of Egg Extraction 
Finally, Congress should require that clinics which perform egg ex-
tractions attempt to retrieve periodic information about former donors. This 
proposal stems from the relative novelty of the procedure and the promi-
nent concern among some advocates that egg extraction can result in cancer 
or other long-term risks to a woman’s health. This is not a radical sugges-
tion, but one inspired by existing law.149 The 1992 Fertility Clinic Success 
 148.  Levine, supra note 28, at 35. 
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Rate and Certification Act, for example, requires fertility clinics which 
perform IVF to provide data for all procedures performed to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).150 The CDC then provides annual 
reports on success rates and monitors all clinics for compliance with the 
standards included in the Act.151
While not perfectly analogous circumstances, a similar requirement 
for periodic monitoring and reporting would provide the CDC and the gov-
ernment the ability to evaluate the long-term risks inherent in the egg ex-
traction process and guide future regulation of the industry. Certainly a 
requirement to monitor former patients for a period would involve clinics 
committing more resources than when they merely reported their own suc-
cess rates. However, clinics presumably retain the contact information of 
donors, and requesting change-of-address notification and distributing pe-
riodic health feedback forms would not represent an insurmountable ad-
ministrative burden or financial cost on these profitable institutions. 
Additionally, while feedback response by former donors would be volun-
tary, such a program could provide valuable information. 
Specifically, the Act has enabled a large amount of scholarship on the 
efficacy of IVF and encouraged various non-governmental organizations to 
provide information about clinics and their relative success rates.152 For 
example, the SART’s website has an interactive map where potential par-
ents can seek out clinics in their area, and look at the efficacy of each 
one.153 One can imagine a future in which donors might be able to look at a 
similar map for clinics to donate, looking at their rates of OHSS and poten-
tially evaluating their accreditation, if legislation included that standard.154
Key within this proposal would be the information-gathering about fu-
ture health effects, however. In the presently unregulated field of egg ex-
traction, women cannot properly weigh the risks and rewards of donating 
eggs. More information is needed for individuals to make informed deci-
sions. Given the significant and yet-unevaluated long-term risk of cancer 
inherent in the egg extraction process, more information is needed to guide 
future regulations. Collecting information from this largely unregulated 
industry, across fifty disparate states, suggests the need for creation of such 
a reporting requirement. While reporting requirements are rare, they are not 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  See, e.g., SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., http://www.sart.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 
2015). 
 153.  IVF Success Rates, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., http://www.sart.org/find_frm.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015).  





      03/25/2015   13:32:44
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 206 Side A      03/25/2015   13:32:44
12P - RADECKI FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2015 3:17 PM 
2015] REGULATING EGG DONATION 755 
unheard of in nascent industries that present potential long-term issues or 
significant risk of harm, as was the motivation behind the 1992 Act dealing 
with in-vitro fertilization.155
Proponents of the egg donation industry should be sympathetic to this 
proposal as well, as a substantial amount of criticism of the egg extraction 
process stems from accusations of opaqueness and consequent exploitation. 
Providing more information to the scientific community enables legislators 
to decide how to further regulate the egg extraction industry. Perhaps most 
importantly, providing women with adequate information that has implica-
tions for their future health is the best way to promote responsible dona-
tions, whereas clouding the process in secrecy encourages skepticism and 
more criticism. 
CONCLUSION
With the proliferation of assisted reproductive technology, both supply 
of and demand for these services is bound to increase. While some seek to 
curtail compensation for donors, the truly problematic aspect of the egg 
donation process lies with a poor regulatory environment. Advertising and 
informed consent requirements enable young women to make reasoned, 
independent decisions about medicine and their own bodies. Requiring 
health coverage protects the physical and financial health of donors. A 
federal reporting requirement ensures that the long-term risks that are yet 
unknown will not stay unknown forever. Together, these regulations can 
provide that egg donation serves not only the interests of the industry, but 
also the women who are so intimately involved in it. 
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